Did the Afghan government knock the main door of peace?
According to Guardian’s 18th October story, Abdul Manan, the brother of Taliban’s former leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, has talked with the Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS) chief Masoam Stanekzai in September and October of this year in Qatar[1].
The news about the held secret talks between Taliban and Afghan government has been vastly reflected in domestic and international media. The Afghan government hasn’t yet officially accepted it but a source in the government has confirmed it. A senior official of the Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) Ismael Qasemyar, although didn’t said anything in details about these talks, but has only confirmed Stanekzai’s recent visit to Qatar[2]. The Taliban, on the other hand, has denied reports of holding secret talks with Afghan government[3].
If the report of secret talks in Qatar is officially confirmed then, after the death announcement of Mullah Omar, it will be the first face-to-face talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban, with a bit difference that this time Pakistan is sidelined by US and Afghan government in these talks.
Whether the National Unity Government’s peace policy is changed or not? What are the Taliban’s concerns regarding the Afghan government and the U.S.’s peace policy? And if the secret talks in Qatar have occurred, what might be its outcomes? In this part of the analysis we have tried to answer these questions.
Elements of the NUG’s peace policy
After the formation of the NUG, peace talks with the Taliban were hastened, compared to the last years of Karzai’s second term in Afghanistan. The Afghan government’s peace policy has three elements: seeking to use international influence over the Taliban, building regional consensus, and establishing contacts with the members of Quetta Shura of the Taliban.
Using international influence over Taliban; after becoming the president of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani started his first foreign visits from countries that were Pakistan’s strategic allies and had influence over Pakistan (for instance Saudi Arabia and China). In the second step he improved relations with Pakistan, gave privileges to Islamabad and in exchange demanded Pakistan’s assistance in peace talks with the Taliban.
Regional consensus: part of the Afghan government and particularly Ashraf Ghani’s peace plan was to build regional consensus over “terrorism” and the Afghan peace process. Because, Ghani believes that, besides Afghans, fighters from Central Asia, Russia, China, Pakistan and Middle East are also fighting in Afghanistan and, thus, on the one hand, the current war in Afghanistan has regional dimensions and on the other hand, if insurgency is not suppressed it would have enormous impacts on the region. Therefore, compared to the last years of Karzai’s second term, the NUG, after its formation in 2014, developed warm relations with Russia, China, Central Asia, India, Europe, America and Middle East.
Contacting the members of the Taliban’s Quetta Shura instead of the Taliban’s political office in Qatar; although, according to various sources, Ashraf Ghani had met the representatives of Taliban’s political office in Dubai during his election campaigns; but when he became the President he, to a great extent, neglected the Taliban’s Qatar office and instead contacted some members of the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura. Pakistan also played a role in establishing these contacts, hence, the Afghan government met members of Quetta Shura first in Urumqi and then in Murree.
The Taliban’s concerns over the U.S. and Afghan government’s peace policy
The Afghan Taliban has some concerns about the U.S. and Afghan government’s peace policy, the most important of which are as follows:
The United states’ limited role in the peace process; the Afghan Taliban believe the United States to be the main party of the current war in Afghanistan and think that the current war would continue till withdrawal of the U.S troops from Afghanistan. After 2010, the United States backed an Afghan-led peace process. After the formation of the NUG, the United States tried to mediate between the Taliban and the Afghan government (as in Murree and Quadrilateral peace talks). But the Afghan Taliban does not want such role of the United States. It is said that the Taliban had set a condition to the United States that till the U.S’s active role in the peace process; they would not conduct peace talks with the Afghan government[4]. Since the United States have recently started peace talks with the Taliban in Qatar; therefore, recent talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government might also be the result of these talks.
Peace through foreign policy; after the formation of the NUG, the Afghan foreign policy regarding peace was activated. The Afghan President’s first unofficial trip was to the Saudi Arabia, his first official trip was to China and also the first President who traveled to Afghanistan was Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In the second step, Ashraf Ghani visited Pakistan and subsequently many senior officials of both countries paid visits to each other’s countries. But the Afghan Taliban, which believe themselves to be independent, on the contrary, in response to this policy of the Afghan government intensified their fight against the Afghan government.
The Taliban’s emphasize on Qatar Office; ever since the beginning, the Taliban have emphasized over Qatar office as their address for peace talks. After Urumqi talks the Afghan Taliban denied these talks and announced that the Taliban’s office in Qatar is the sole address for negotiations. In response to Murree talks, the Taliban released a statement and increased the powers of their office in Qatar. The statement read: “if anyone, without the permission of the Islamic Emirates’ leadership or Qatar’s office, attends meetings or conduct political talks; such act, either if it is done in the past or happen afterwards, is an individual effort and can never represent the Islamic Emirates”[5] .
Has the Afghan government’s peace policy changed?
After the failure of the Quadrilateral talks, the Afghan government became suspicious of Pakistan’s role. This suspicious is apparent in a piece published on the Afghan Presidential palace’s official website, which reads: “after the creation of the NUG, Ashraf Ghani started talks with the Pakistani Army; meaning that the important party of the Afghan case is Pakistan and therefore, talks must be conducted with Islamabad’s main authorities. But it did not have tangible achievement as yet. The Afghan government is skeptical to Pakistan’s mediation and believes that the peace process is an intra-Afghan process and the Afghans themselves must set together and reach a conclusion”[6]. Hence, the Afghan government did not conduct peace talks with Hezb-e-Islami (Hekmatyar) through Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) meetings, and signed a peace deal with Hezb through an intra-Afghan peace process. Although foreigners supported these talks but these talks, to a great extent, was the result of direct talks between the Afghan government and Hezb-e-Islami.
In the meanwhile, the Afghan Taliban has also become skeptical to Pakistan’s role in the recent past. That is why; they conducted direct talks, without Pakistan’s mediation, with Americans in Qatar. Although details about these talks remain unrevealed but in response to these talks Pakistan has arrested several Taliban leaders last week, the most prominent of whom was Mullah Nani[7].
Besides that, after the failure of the quadrilateral talks insecurity increased and war intensified in the country. The countries’ major cities are contested and war continues in Kunduz, Urozgan, Helmand, Farah and Nimroz. Due to insecurities, the Afghan government is also under pressure because on the one hand; war increases the mortalities of the Afghan security forces and on the other hand, it undermines the Afghan government’s achievements.
If the news about the NDS chief’s talks with the Taliban’s political office in Qatar is accurate; it is an indication of the change in the Afghan government’s peace policy and it means that the Afghan government has responded positively to the Taliban’s concern on which they had emphasized for a long time.
Conclusion
Generally, direct talks between the parties of the issue are promising and the more direct talks are conducted between them the more will they get close to the resolution of the issue. There, if vis-à-vis talks between the Afghan Taliban and the Afghan government have occurred; it must be vastly welcomed.
The need for a mediator group is necessary, irrespective of secret talks in Qatar. The mediator group will be helpful in decreasing trust deficit between Afghan government and Taliban, pave the way for direct talks, remove some hindrances and will play a guarantor role, to some extent. In this regards, some strives have been made by few sides.[8] But, they are not yet officially recognized by Afghan government and Taliban.
A mediator group can be helpful, because, as it would be completely informed about the on-going peace process, it can bring the peace process back on track through public pressure if the peace process becomes stall or a side refused to deliver its promises. For instance, whenever peace talks between Afghan government and Hezb-e-Isami (Hekmatary) were faced with hurdles, public opinion and public pressure pushed peace talks to continue, because, almost all the civil societies and public were aware of such talks.
The end
[1] Sami Yousafzai, Jon Boone, Sune Engel Rasmussen, Taliban and Afghanistan restart secret talks in Qatar, The Guardian, 18 Oct 2016, see it online:< https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/18/taliban-afghanistan-secret-talks-qatar>
[2] Read more on this this page:
http://pa.azadiradio.com/a/28061114.html
[3] Read voa’s report in this regard:
http://www.pashtovoa.com/a/afghan-government-and-taliban-peace-talk-in-qatar/3555833.html
[4] read more in voa’s this report: http://www.pashtovoa.com/a/afghan-government-taliban-talks-in-doha/3556231.html
[5] Read the full statement of the Taliban here:
http://alemara1.org/?p=19802
[6] Read more on the website of the Presidential Palace:
http://president.gov.af/ps/analysis/107585
[7] For more details visit: http://pa.azadiradio.com/a/28048234.html
[8] Center for Strategic & Regional Studies, Dr. Amin: we presented the scheme of intra-Afghan reconciliation to the Taliban/interview, August 8, 2016: